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NOTES
RECOVERY LEGISLATION-CHAPTER 476, LAWS OF 1933.-The days
of the governmental policy of laissez-faire being numbered, and
national enlightenment proceeding on a broad front2 it is perhaps
both wise and important to thoughtfully consider the paternalistic en-
actments of state legislatures arising out of our most recent national
emergency, particularly the so-called "Wisconsin Recovery Act."
3
1 "The battle for an individualistic laissez faire economy is definitely lost * * *
we shall do well to avert our eyes from the pretense that we can achieve a
fundamentally individualistic society * * * why not frankly acknowledge that
sensible management for collective purposes is the necessary control, and see
what we can do to achieve it?" George Soule, A Planned Society (1932), 172.
"The appeal to laissez faire in industry for instance, has come to mean a mere
partisan request for leave to engage in a street brawl which interferes with
the legitimate pursuits of everyone else. It becomes more and more clear that
these freedoms have to be restricted." Tugwell, An Industrialized Society
(1933),33.
2 "In proportion as a structure of a government gives force to public opinion,
it is essential that public opinion should be enlightened." Washington, Fare-
well Address.
3Chapter 476, Laws of 1933. Published July 29, 1933.
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It is axiomatic that the United States government is by its constitu-
tion a government of limited enumerated and delegated powers,-
and that as to these express powers it may enact all laws which may
be necessary and proper to carry into effect the powers expressly
granted to it', but that to go beyond this the federal government would
be trespassing upon the sovereign rights of the several states. 6 These
rights are comprehensively denominated the "police power" to protect
public safety, health, and morals, over which the state has exclusive
control,7 provided that there is no conflict with the provisions of federal
legislation," or the constitution.9 "These propositions are too numerous-
ly confirmed by repeated unanimous decisions to admit of a doubt."
When the National Industrial Recovery Act,10 was published, it
was realized immediately that it was probably limited to interstate com-
merce, and that as far as intrastate commerce was concerned, state leg-
islation was needed." Consequently many state legislatures," have
4 Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch 137, 2 L.Ed. 60 (1803).
5 Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat. 1, 6 L.Ed. 23 (1824).6 Sturges v. Cro'wnishield, 4 Wheat. 122, 4 L. Ed. 529 (1819).
7See Note 5.
S New York v. Miln, 11 Pet. 102, 9 L.Ed. 648 (1837) ; Sherlock v. Ailing, 93 U.S.
99, 23 L.Ed. 819 (1876) ; Mobile County v. Kimball, 102 U.S. 691, 26 L.Ed. 238
(1880) ; Parkersburg, etc., Transportation Company v. Parkersburg, 107 U.S.
691, 2 Sup. Ct. 732, 27 L.Ed. 584 (1882) ; Huese v. Glover, 119 U.S. 543, 7 Sun.
Ct. 313, 30 L.Ed. 487 (1886) ; Luken v Lake Shore, etc.. R. Company, 248 Ill.
377, 94 N.E. 175, 140 Am. St. Rep. 220, 21 Ann. Cas. 82 (1911) ; Harrigan v.
The Conn. R. L. Company, 129 Mass. 580, 37 Am. Rep. 387 (1880) ; Burrows
v. Delta Transportation Company, 106 Mich. 582, 64 N.W. 501, 29 L.R.A. 468
(1895).
9 Morgan's Louisiana & T. R. & S. Co'-wpany v. Louisiana Board of Health,
118 U.S. 455, 6 Sup. Ct. 1114, 30 L.Ed. 237 (1885); Johnson v. Chicago
& P. Elevator Comipany, 119 U.S. 388, 7 Sup. Ct. 254. 30 L.Ed. 447
(1886) ; Sands v. The Manistee R. Imp. Company, 123 U.S. 288, 8 Sup. Ct. 118,
31 L.Ed. 149 (1887) ; Wadhams Oil Company v. Tracy, 141 Wis. 150, 123 N.W.
785, 18 Ann. Cas. (1909).
See, Nebraska Law Bulletin, Nov. 1932, "What Is Meant by 'Police Power',"
F. Essert. "The power of promoting the public welfare by restraining and
regulating the use of liberty and property" is the definition of Prof. Ernest
Freund in his book, The Police Power, Public Policy and Constitutional
Rights (1904). This work precede dthe great development of that subject in
the United States Supreme Court. Such leading and significant cases as Loch-
ner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 25 Sup. Ct. 529, 49 L.Ed. 937 (1905); Jacobsen
v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 25 Sup. Ct. 258, 49 L.Ed. 643 (1905); Adair v.
United States, 208 U.S. 161, 28 Sup. Ct. 277, 52 L.Ed. 436 (1908) ; and Noble
State Bank v. Haskell, 219 U.S. 104, 31 Sup. Ct. 386, 58 L.Ed. 112 (1911) had
not been decided--"nevertheless the book has a considerable amount of pro-
phetic vision."
10 Acts of the Seventy-Third Congress, Extra Session, Act of June 16, 1933, 48
St. L. -
"1 "The question will arise as to the applicability of any such code (federal code)
to commerce which would be wholly intrastate in character. It may well be that
intrastate transactions are included by reason of the fact that they effect inter-
state commerce. It would be preferable, however, to enact legislation explicitly
bringing intrastate transactions within the provision of any code which is ap-
proved by the President. In this way, violators of the code could not escape
punishment by asserting that the law is ineffective insofar as it applies to
intrastate transactions." Special Message to the Legislature of New York,
Governor Herbert Lehmann. The necessity for state legislation was indicated
at an early date by the N.I.R.A. authorities. See, N.I.R.A. official release No. 7,
June 22, 1933; id. No. 27, July 5, 1933.
"2California, Colorado, Kansas, Massachusetts, New Jersey, New York, Ohio,
Texas, Utah, Virginia, and Wisconsin. See Note 58.
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passed similar recovery legislation. This being obviously an exercise of
the "police power" as defined by Professor Freund," it is necessary to
determine what has been previously held to be a valid exercise thereof
to determine whether this type of legislation generally exceeds its limi-
tations.' 4
It has been held that a state may in the exercise of its police power,
and without denial of the equal protection of the laws, prescribe rea-
sonble regulations for the practice within its jurisdiction of the various
professions, trades, and occupations, and for the conduct of business.' 5
The beneficent exercise of the police power has been gradually ex-
tended in scope,' 6 but prior to 1929 it was apparent that the complete
welfare of" the public was by no means achieved.17 However, agitation
to subordinate private rights in property and contract to social needs
caused legislative bodies to respond first in the matter of "yellow dog"
contracts. Founded on the idea that there is a substantial inequality in
bargaining power between the employer and employee, and that labor
unions are necessary instruments for advancing the workers' interests,
13 Freund, op. cit., 260 -294, contains a careful cataloging of economic interests
that have been secured.
14 "Consideration of public health and welfare are superior to the rights of priv-
ate property and so-called vested rights." State ex rel. Atty. Gen. v. Thekan,
184 Wis. 42, 198 N.W. 729 (1924).
15 People v. Van De Carr, 199 U.S. 552, 26 Sup. Ct. 144, 50 L.Ed. 305 (1905);
Ah Sin v. Wittinan, 198 U.S. 500, 25 Sup. Ct. 756, 49 L.Ed. 643, 3 Ann. Cas.
765 (1904) ; Jacobsen v. Mass., supra; Davis v. Massachusetts, 167 U.S. 43, 17
Sup. Ct. 731, 42 L.Ed. 71 (1897) ; Jones v. Brin, 165 U.S. 180, 17 Sup. Ct. 282,
41 L. Ed. 677 (1896) ; Minneapolis, etc., R. Company v. Beckwith, 129 U.S.
26, 9 Sup. Ct. 207, 32 L.Ed. 107 (1888); Missouri Pacific R. Company v.
Humes, 115 U.S. 512, 6 Sup. Ct. 110, 29 L.Ed. 463 (1885) ; Missouri Pacific R.
Co. v. Mackey, 127 U.S. 205, 8 Sup. Ct. 1161, 32 L.Ed. 107 (1887) ; Soon Hing
v. Crowley, 113 U.S. 703, 5 Sup. Ct. 730, 28 L.Ed. 1145 (1884) ; Barbier v. Con-
nolly, 113 U.S. 27, 5 Sup. Ct. 357, 28 L. Ed. 923 (1885); Also, Mehlos v. Mil-
waukee, 156 Wis. 591, 146 N.W. 882, 51 L.R.A. (N.S.) 1009 (1914), sustain-
ing an ordinance regulating public dance halls. For an extended citation of
cases on this point see 12 C.J. 1157.
16 "It may be said in a general way that the police power extends to all the great
public needs * * * it may be put forth in aid of what is sanctioned by usage
or held by the prevailing majority of strong and preponderant opinion to be
greatly and immediately necessary to the public welfare." Holmes, J. in Noble
State Bank v. Haskell, supra.
17 "If we think of those in all our industries who may lack mechanical skill but
who nevertheless shoulder the heavy weights and do the roughest work, we
find a great part of American industry shot through with these unfortunates.
It is not exaggeration to say that we have some millions of these hard-worked
but underpaid Americans. Taken together with their families and their de-
pendents, I would venture to say that we have among us ten to fifteen millions
of people who do not share as they should in the prosperity enjoyed by the
rest of us. Morally, economically, and on the grounds of simple humanity, this
inequality should not be allowed to exist in this richest nation in history." Ad-
dress of James 3. Davis, Secretary of Labor in President Coolidge's Cabinet,
June 22, 1927, quoted in Nystrom, Economic Principles of Consumption (1929),
180 et seq. See also dissent of Mr. Justice Brandeis in Louis K. Liggett Com-
pany v. Lee, 288 U.S. 517, 53 Sup. Ct. 581, 77 L.Ed. 553 (1933). This dissent
is heavily annotated with references to material bearing on growth of great
American corporations relative to their effect upon the general public well
being. See also Gardiner Means, The Growth of the Relative Importance of
the Large Corporation in Amcrican Economic Life, 21 Am. Econ. Rev. 10-37
(1931). See Berle & Means, The Modern Corporation and Private Property
(1932).
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eight states have enacted laws declaring as void, agreements exacted
from the employee as a condition of his employment, not to join labor
unions.18 In addition laws requiring employers to maintain unemploy-
ment insurance or reserve funds have been enacted.19 Because of the gen-
eral agricultural unrest, indicated more boldly by farmers' strikes and
picketing on highways and the dumping of milk, statutes have been en-
acted in at least four states to fix the price of milk ;20 minimum wage
laws were enacted in five states for the benefit of women and mifiors ;21
and finally legislation to check over-production and prevent waste,
duplication of service, supply and demand of goods "to the end that
capital be not wasted in unwise ventures; the labor market be not dis-
turbed; and eras of alternating hilarious prosperity and melancholic de-
18 Arizona, Colorado, New Jersey, Ohio, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Utah, and Wis-
consin. See, 21 Am. Lab. Leg. Rev. 168-172 (1932); and also, Witte, "Yellow
Dog Contracts," 6 Wis. Law Rev. 21 (1930).
19 Chapter 20, Laws of Wisconsin, Special Session, 1931-32. 23 Am. Lab. Leg.
Rev. 9 and 73 (1933); see also, Chapter 20, supra, as amended, Chapters 186
and 383, Laws of 1933; also, Goodrich, "Unemployment Reserves by Law,"
22 Am. Lab. Leg. Rev. 33 (1932); Brandeis and Raushenbush, "Wisconsin's
Unemployment Reserves & Compensation Act," 7 Wis. Law Rev. 136 (1932) ;
Lambert, "Compulsory Unemployment Insurance & Due Process of Law," 7
Wis. Law Rev. 146 (1932); Commons, "The Groves Unemployment Reserves
Law," 22 Am. Lab. Leg. Rev. 8 (1932); Jacobson, "The Wisconsin Unemploy-
ment Compensation Act," 32 Col. Law Rev. 409 (1932) ; Raushenbush, "Wis-
consin's Unemployment Compensation Act," 22 Am. Lab. Leg. Rev. 11 (1932).
This proposed legislation falls into two types, first, based upon an insurance
idea, sometimes called the Ohio plan; and second, the Reserve plan. As to
the efficacy and workability of these two plans see article by Karl T. Compton,
in 23 Am. Lab. Leg. Rev. 96 (1933).
20 Chapter 64, Laws of Wisconsin of 1933; Chapter 158, Laws of New York of
1933; Chapter 169, Laws of New Jersey of 1933; H. B. No. 671, Ohio, 1933.
Section 300 of the New York Act provides "This article is enacted in the
exercise of the police power of the state, and its purposes generally are to
protect the public health and public welfare."
21 Illinois, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, and Utah. See, Monthly
Labor Review, issue of June, 1933. In the teeth of the United States Supreme
Court's reactionary decision in Adkins v. Children's Hospital, 261 U.S. 525, 43
Sup. Ct. 394, 67 L.Ed. 785 (1923), where the Court held unconstitutional a
similar act for the District of Columbia, these enactments were bold steps
forward and are in line with Mr. Justice Holmes' conception of the police
power. Nine other states already had such legislation; California, Colorado,
Massachusetts, Minnesota, North Dakota, Oregon, South Dakota, Washington
and Wisconsin. The preamble to the Illinois and New York Acts state ex-
pressly the guiding and uniform philosophy on which they are based: Illinois,
"Many women and minors employed for gain in the State of Illinois are not
as a class equally equipped for bargaining with their employers in regard to
a minimum fair wage and standards, and 'freedom of contract' as applied to
their relations with their employers is in many cases illusory." The New York
Act states: "The evils of oppressive unreasonable and unfair wages are such
as to render imperative the exercise of the police power of the state for the
protection of industry and of the men and women and minors employed there-
in, and of the public interest of the community at large in their health and
well-being and in the prevention of the deterioration of the race."
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pression be banished," 22 have come in the National Industrial Recovery
Act,23 and similar state legislation.24
It must be conceded at the outset that these laws in respect to their
probable economic and social effect are unprecedented.2 5 Moreover,
the conclusion cannot be avoided that the Supreme Court of the United
States when construing the scope of the police power in the light of the
due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment has almost always,
without exception, leaned towards the reactionary side, and held for
private rights in property and contract and the practically unrestrained
bargaining power of the vested interests, and has refused to lend a
hand to the more economically inferior party.25 Prior to 1908 it might
be said that there was a tendency on the part of the federal supreme
court to admit at least that inequality between employer and employee
was possible, 27 and that the police power might extend to the regula-
22Ray A. Brown and Howard L. Hall, "The Police Power in Its Relation to
Economic Reconstruction," 1 Chicago Law Rev. 224 (1933). The authors of
this article deal with this subject very comprehensively, giving much valuable
data.
23 "We have not been brought to our present state by any natural calamity, by
drougth, or floods, or earthquakes, or by the destruction of our productive
machinery or man power. We have a superabundance of raw materials, of
equipment for manufacturing these materials into the goods we need, and
transportation and commercial facilities for making these available to all who
need them. A great portion of our machinery stands idle, while millions of
able-bodied men and women in dire need are clamoring for the opportunity
to work. Our power to operate the economic machine we have created is chal-
lenged * * * That which seems most important to me in the long run is the
problem of controlling by adequate planning the creation and the distribu-
tion of those products, which our vast economic machine is capable of yield-
ing." Franklin D. Roosevelt, Looking Forward, (1933), 45, 47.24 See Note 12, supra. In the Special Session of the 1931 Wisconsin Legislature
a measure know as Bill No. 3A was introduced with the sanction of Governor
LaFollette to foster economic planning. It did not pass-probably for political
reasons. "When the nation becomes substantially united in favor of planning
the broad objectives of civilization, then true leadership must unite thought
behind definite methods." Roosevelt, op. cit., supra Note 23, 47. In 1929 the
Committee on Recent Economic Changes of President Hoover's Conference
on Unemployment reported through Wesley C. Mitchell: "If we are to main-
tain business prosperity we must continue to earn it, month aiter month, and
year after year by intelligent effort."
25 "The bill marks a far-reaching departure from the philosophy that the gov-
ernment should remain a silent spectator while the people of the United States,
without plan, without organization, vainly attempt to achieve their social and
economic ideals. It recognizes that planlessness and disjunctive efforts lead to
waste, destruction, exploitation and disaster and that purposive planning awaits
the substitution of regulated planning in place of the unlimited and frequently
pernicious competition which we have heretofore regarded as the sole guardian
of the public welfare." Sen. Robert F. Wagner before the Committee On
Finance of the United States Senate, as reported in Fed. Trade Rev. Serv.
C. C. H. (7th ed. 1933), 1944 et seq.
26 Consider the case of Adkins v. Childrens' Hospital, supra, where the Court
as late as 1923 was mentally living in a world of Utopian economic bliss, indi-
cating its belief that women and children could bargain equally with employers(usually large corporate interests) as to fair wages and hours of employ-
ment.
27 See, Holden v. Hardy, 169 U.S. 366, 18 Sup. Ct. 383, 42 L.Ed. 780 (1898). In
Knoxville Iron Company v. Harbison, 183 U.S. 13, 22 Sup. Ct. 1, 46 L.Ed. 55
(1901), the Court said as to a statute requiring that all orders for merchan-
dise given in payment of wages be redeemable at their face value in cash:
"The statute's tendency, though slight it may be, is to place the employer and
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tion of business clothed with something in the nature of a public inter-
est.28 Subsequent thereto the Supreme Court made an about face. Adair
v. United States29 held unconstitutional a statute making it a crime for
an employer to interfere, by discharge, threats of discharge, or by im-
posing restrictive agreements in the contract of employment, with the
employee's right to join a labor union. 0 This decision was followed by
Coppage v. Kansas3l involving the same type of statute wherein the
court reiterated its opinion in the former case.' 2 In 1923 Adkins v.
Children's Hospital-3 was decided and from then on it was conceded
that individual rights were supreme, and the general public welfare
was in effect disregarded.' 4 This change in attitude of the court was
further reflected in the opinions following Munn v. Illinois3" to that
historic day in October of 1929. At the same term of court at which the
Munn case was decided statutes relating to the fixing of railroad rates
were sustained;"6 later regulation of prices for grain elevators were
sustained,' 7 and for fire insurance companies, 8 and also for carriers of
oil by means of pipe lines.'9 From this point the recession begins. The
first case reaffirming the individualistic theories of economy was Chas.
Wolff Packing Co. v. Court of Industrial Relations"0 decided in 1923,
in which the court maintained that the manufacture and transportation
of food, clothing, and fuel were not such businesses as were affected
employee upon equal ground in the matter of wages, and so far as calculated
to accomplish that end it deserves commendation."
28 This was the doctrine enunciated in the famous case of Munn v. Illinois, 94
U.S. 113, 24 L.Ed. 77 (1877), where the Court sustained the fixing of storage
charges for grain elevators in the City of Chicago. The court said: "When
private property is affected with a public interest it ceases to be a jus privati
only * * * Property does become clothed with a public interest when used in a
manner to make it of public consequence, and affect the community at large.
When, therefore, one devotes his property to a use in which the public has an
interest, he in effect grants to the public, interest in that use, and must submit
to be controlled by the public for the common good."
29 208 U.S. 161, 28 Sup. Ct. 277, 52 L.Ed. 436 (1908).
30 It is interesting to note that Mr. Justice Harlan maintained there existed no
inequality but rather equality of right of contract, which the Supreme Court
was bound to protect!
"1236 U.S. 1, 35 Sup. Ct. 240, 59 L.Ed. 441 (1915).
"In this case Mr. Justice Pitney admits an inequality exists, but that this is
true of all contracts and that there always will be inequality of fortunes. It
might be interesting at this point to look at Truax v. Corrigan, 257 U.S. 312,
42 Sup. Ct. 124, 66 L.Ed. 254 (1921) which further indicates the stubborn at-
titude of the Supreme Court in its defense of capitalism against the further
"baiting" by labor.
"3 See Note 21, supra.
34Gibbons, Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire, Vol. I, Chap. IX: "Civil
governments in their first institution, are voluntary associations for mutual
defense. To obtain the desired end it is absolutely necessary that each indi-
vidual should conceive himself obliged to submit his private opinion and ac-
tions to the judgment of the greater number of his associates."
35 See Note 28, supra.
3 C. B. & Q. Ry. Co. v. Iowa, 94 U.S. 155, 24 L.Ed. 94 (1877).
"7Budd v. New York, 143 U.S. 517, 12 Sup. Ct. 468, 36 L.Ed. 247 (1892) ; Brass
v. North Dakota, 153 U.S. 391, 14 Sup. Ct., 857, 38 L.Ed. 757 (1894).
s3 German Alliance Ins. Co. v. Lewis, 233 U.S. 389, 34 Sup. Ct. 612, 58 L.Ed. 1011
(1914).
9United States v. Ohio Oil Co., 234 U.S. 548, 34 Sup. Ct., 956, 58 L.Ed. 1459
(1914).
40262 U.S. 522, 43 Sup. Ct. 630, 67 L.Ed. 1103 (1923).
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with public interest, which the people of the state could regulate to pro-
tect themselves in case of industrial strikes. With the succeeding cases
of Tyson v. Banton4 ' in 1927 involving the fixing of prices for resold
theater tickets, Ribnick v. McBride,42 where the state attempted to con-
trol employment agencies, and Williams v. Standard Oil Co.,4 3 in which
the state attempted to fix the price of gasoline, "the retreat became
almost a rout ;,,4' and Justice Sutherland who wrote all three of the
latter opinions held the acts unconstitutional as violative of the due
process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and limited the effect of
Munn v. Illinois to cases with the same set of facts, stating that "a bus-
iness in order to be affected with a public interest must be such or be
.so employed as to justify the conclusion that it has been devoted to a
public use and its use thereby in effect granted to the public." (Italics
Mr. Justice Sutherland's).45 The conclusion of this line of decisions
comes with the comparatively recent case of New State Ice Co. v. Lieb-
mann,46 where the court held unconstitutional a statute denying to any
person the right to enter into the business of manufacturing ice if in
the opinion of the commission there were already sufficient facilities to
meet public demands.4 7
If the only constitutional question here concerned were the matter
of emergency legislation,4 8 it is highly probable that state recovery leg-
islation would be sustained in view of the decisions in the Legal Tender
Cases,49 Wilson v. New,50 and the Rent Cases.51 "An emergency may
41273 U.S. 418, 47 Sup. Ct. 426, 71 L.Ed. 718 (1927).42277 U.S. 350, 48 Sup. Ct. 545, 72 L.Ed. 913 (1928).
43278 U.S. 235, 49 Sup. Ct. 115, 73 L.Ed. 289 (1929).
44 See Note 22, supra.
45 Mr. Justice Stone dissenting in Ribnick v. McBride, said: "Price regulation
* * * is within a state's power whenever any combination of circumstances
seriously curtails the regulative force of competition so that buyers or sellers
are placed at such a disadvantage in the bargaining struggle that a legislature
might reasonably anticipate serious consequences to the community as a
whole."
46 285 U.S. 262, 52 Sup. Ct. 371, 76 L.Ed. 747 (1932).
47 Mr. Justice Brandeis in his dissenting opinion says: "The people of the United
States are now confronted with an emergency more serious than war. Misery
is wide-spread in a time, not of scarcity, but of over-abundance * * * Rightly
or wrongly, many persons think that one of the major contributing causes has
been unbridled competition. Increasingly, doubt is expressed whether it is
economically wise, or morally right, that men should be permitted to add to the
producing facilities of an industry, which is already suffering from over-
capacity." It must be said that for anyone gathering material on this subject,
he may be well satisfied with only that presented in this dissent, which is sus-
tained by innumerable authorities.
4Chapter 476, Laws of Wisconsin, 1933, in 109.02: "This chapter * * * shall
cease to exist at the expiration of two years * * * " In Chapter 186, Laws
of Wisconsin, 1933, the compulsory operation of Wisconsin Unemployment
Reserves Act was extended "until business recovery is well under way in
Wisconsin."
49 12 Wall. 457, 20 L.Ed. 287 (1871) where the Court sustained the authority of
the state to issue money in the emergency caused by the Civil war.
50243 U.S. 332, 37 Sup. Ct. 298, 61 L.Ed. 755 (1917) where the Court sustained
the fixation of wages and hours of railroad employees to avoid a threatened
nation-wide railroad, strike.
51 Here the regulation of rents by a governmental commission was sustained due
to an acute housing shortage with consequent high rents, shortly after the
World War. Block v. Hirsh, 256 U.S. 135, 41 Sup. Ct. 458, 65 L.Ed. 865
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not call into life a power which has never lived, nevertheless the emer-
gency may afford a reason for the exertion of a living power already
enjoyed. ' 52 Two recent cases sustaining this emergency exercise of a
power and which may be considered important in this respect are Peo-
ple v. Nebbia5 3 and Home Building & Loan Ass'n. v. Blaisdell.54
In the former case an act regulating the milk business and authorizing
the milk control board to fix minimum wholesale and retail prices was
held constitutional ;55 in the latter, a statute authorizing the extension
of redemption period in mortgage foreclosures, during the present
emergency, was held a valid exercise of the police power.56
To surmount certain constitutional difficulties some of the states
have enacted emergency recovery legislation regulating intrastate com-
merce ;58 and all have provided, with the exception of Wisconsin, for
the enforcement of the standards of fair competition established by the
national code, either by fines, injunctions issued at the suit of the state,
or, in extraordinary cases, the use of the liceniing power. California,
New Jersey, Ohio, and Utah have gone further and have provided for
local codes. All the state enactments, except that of Utah, require that
the provisions of section 7 of the federal act be in the state codes.58
(1921) ; Marcus Brown Holding Company v. Feldman, 256 U.S. 170, 41 Sup.
Ct. 465, 65 L.Ed. 877 (1921) ; Levy Leasing Company v. Siegel, 258 U.S. 242,
42 Sup. Ct. 289, 66 L.Ed. 595 (1922). But in 1924 in Chastleton Corporation v.
Sinclair, 264 U.S. 543, 44 Sup. Ct. 405, 68 L.Ed. 841 (1924), it was held that
when the emergency ceases to exist, the acts are inoperative and unenforce-
able.
52 See Note 50, supra.
53 (N.Y., 1933), 186 N.E. 694. See, Southport Petroleum Conpany v. Ickes, (see,
C. C. H. Fed. Trade Regl. Service, 7th ed. 5203), decided August 15, 1933 by
Supreme Court of District of Columbia, which held constitutional sec. 9 (c)
of the N.I.R.A.; Economy Dairy Co. v. Wallace (C. C. H. Fed. Trade Regl.
Service, 7th ed., 5201) decided August 29, 1933, by the same court which held
constitutional the Agricultural Adjustment Act
5454 Sup. Ct. 231 (1934) ; Contra: State ex rel. Cleveringa v. Klein, (N.D.,
1933), 249 N.W. 118.
55 Chapter 158, New York Laws of 1933, sec. 300: "This article is enacted in the
exercise of the police power of the state and its purposes generally are to pro-
tect the public health and public welfare." Other sec. headings: 302-Milk
Control Board; 308-Licenses to Milk Dealers; 312-Order Fixing Price of
Milk.
56 Some. authorities are inclined to minimize the effect of this decision. It might
be fairly said that while the decision merely construes a state statute, it goes
a long way in sanctioning of the further extension of the scope of the police
power.
5 California (see, Session Laws 1933, c. 1037, 1039) ; Colorado, (see, Session
Laws, Extraordinary Session, 1933, c. 1) ; Kansas (see, House Bill No. 2, ap-
proved November 20, 1933) ; Massachusetts, (see, Acts 1933, No. 347, approved
July 22, 1933) ; New Jersey, (see. Laws 1933, c. 372) ; New York, (see, Laws
1933, c. 781) ; Ohio, (see, House Bill No. 705, approved July 12, 1933) ; Texas,(see, House Bill No. 10-X, approved October 23, 1933) ; Utah, (see, Senate
Bill No. 10, approved July 31, 1933) ; Virginia, (see, Senate Bill No. 19, ap-
proved September 14, 1933) ; and Wisconsin (see, Laws 1933, c. 476). For an
excellent discussion of the content and effect of these statutes see paper read
before Wisconsin State Bar Ass'n., Dec. 8, 1933 by Francis C. Wilson of the
New Mex. Bar, "National Industrial Recovery Act and the Response of the
States." See also, "Some Legal Aspects of N.I.R.A.," 47 Har. Law Rev. 85,
117 (1933).
58 Provides for maximum hours of labor, minimum rates, right of organization
and collective bargaining, with provisions against compulsory company unions
and "Yellow Dog" contracts.
NOTES
Virginia and New York did not anticipate that local codes would be
necessary, providing that federal codes when approved shall apply to
the intrastate trade of that state,59 accompanied by the necessary en-
forcement provisions. In some states there will be additional constitu-
tional difficulties where the state constitutions contain provisions as to
the illegality of agreements to fix prices or to control production, 60 or
where the state constitutions impose on the state legislature the duty
of enacting appropriate enforcement measures.6 1 All of these states,
with the exception of California, have exempted from liability under
their respective anti-trust laws any action complying with any code,62
either national or local.
The Wisconsin act differs from the legislation of other states in
that it provides for the approval, adoption, and enforcement of separ-
ate codes for intrastate trade by the state administration, distinct from
any national codes. It is in many points identical with the national
recovery act. It provides in substance:
First, the declaration of policy, that the purpose of the Act is to
relieve unemployment and disorganization of industry in the present
emergency, to promote cooperation among trade groups and between
employers and employees, to eliminate unfair competitive practices, and
to improve the standards of labor.6
3
Second, that it shall cease to be in effect two years from the date
of enactment, or sooner, if the Governor shall declare that the emer-
gency under which the Act was created has ceased to exist.64
Third, that the Governor may delegate his functionings and powers
to such officers, agents, and employees as he shall see fit, and may
utilize such other State officers as he deems necessary. 5
5 For an adequate discussion of legislation by reference, see Wilson, op. cit.,
Note 57, supra.
60North Dakota Const. Art. VII, Sec. 14; South Dakota Const. Art. XVII,
Sec. 20; Wyoming Const. Art. X, Sec. 8.61Arizona Const., Art. XIV, See. 15; Idaho Const. Art. XI, Sec. 18; Montana
Const. Art. XV, Sec. 20; Utah Const. Art. XII, Sec. 20; Washington Const.
Art. XII, Sec. 22; New Mexico Const. Art. IV, Sec. 38, provides that "Legis-
lature shall enact laws * * * to prevent combinations in restraint of trade."
Louisiana Const. Art. XIX, Sec. 14, is by its terms self-executing and en-
forceable by injunction.
62 None of these, except Utah, has constitutional anti-trust provisions. Utah and
those states having constitutional provisions are, in the opinion of a few au-
thorities, likely to meet with strong arguments against the validity of the
codes, as contravening their respective constitutions. The force of this conten-
tion is somewhat weakened in the light of the recent philosophy of the Su-
preme Court in Home Building & Loan Ass'n. v. Blaisdell, supra.
63 109.01. Cf. sec. 1, N.I.R.A. See Note 48, supra.
64 109.02. Cf. sec. 2 (c), N.I.R.A. See Note 48, supra.
65 109.03. Cf. sec. 2 (a) and 2 (b), N.I.R.A. Mr. L. C. Whittet has been appoint-
ed the administrator for the state recovery act with otfices in the Capitol build-
ing, Madison. The writer is indebted to Mr. Whittet for valuable material and
suggestions.
At the present time the governor is utilizing the services of the Industrial
Commission in the investigation of violations of this chapter.
For a comprehensive discussion of the delegation of powers under the
N.I.R.A. and similar recovery legislation see 47 Har. Law Rev. 85, 93. See
also the following cases in which the Wisconsin court has sanctioned the dele-
gation to commissions of power to determine the administration of the laws
and give effect thereto: State v. Railroad Camm. of Wis., 140 Wis. 145, 121
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Fourth, that the method of adoption for the individual trade or in-
dustrial codes shall be by application to the Governor and if the Gov-
ernor finds that the code has (a) been approved by a preponderant
number of the persons engaged in the industry, (b) that those approv-
ing do the preponderant amount of the business in units of output, and
(c) that such group pay a prepoderant amount of the wages in the
industry or trade group; it is also necessary that the Governor shall
find that no such association or group applying shall impose inequitable
restrictions on admission to membership therein; that the code pro-
posed is not designed to promote monopolies or to eliminate small en-
terprises; that the code promotes the interest of consumers; that it is
in harmony with the Federal Code; and that it is necessary for the
stabilization of the intrastate commerce of such trade or industry.
The Governor may as a condition of approval for any such code im-
pose any such conditions as may be necessary to protect the interest of
consumers, competitors and employees, and may modify such by ex-
ceptions and exemptions as he sees fit.66
Upon approval the code shall bind all persons and firms engaged in
such trade or industry as to its intrastate business. The code shall, inter
alia, establish standards of maximum hours of labor, minimum rates of
pay, and working conditions, and where the code provides that it shall
constitute unfair competition to sell below the cost of production, the
Governor may provide a method for determining said cost. Every code
of fair competition shall contain as a condition precedent to approval,
the following provisions: (a) that employees shall have the right to
organize and bargain collectively and shall be free from any interfer-
N.W. 919 (1909) ; State v. Kenosha Elec. Ry. Co., 145 Wis. 337, 129 N.W. 600
(1911); Lime Co. v. Railroad Comm., 144 Wis. 523, 129 N.W. 605 (1911);
City of Milwaukee v. Railroad Caom., 162 Wis. 127, 155 N.W. 948 (1916);
State v. Canning Co., 164 Wis. 228, 160 N.W. 57 (1916) ; State v. Whitman,
196 Wis. 472, 220 N.W. 929 (1928); Wis Tel. Co. v. Pub. Serv. Com"m., 206
Wis. 589, 240 N.W 411 (1932).
66 109.04. Cf. sec. 3 (a) and sec. 6, N.I.R.A. A detail of the method of the formu-
lation, adoption, and approval of the codes is contained in Bulletin No. 1 of
the Wisconsin Recovery Administration. It provides, inter alia, that the code
shall be checked by the following state departments to see that the state laws
are complied with and that the public interest is safeguarded: Dept. of Agri-
culture and Markets, Industrial Commission, Insurance Commission, State
Board of Vocational Education, and the Attorney General. Public hearings
shall be had on each code before approved and notice thereof shall be given
at least one week in advance. To date one code has been approved and is in
effect, viz., the Cleaning & Dyeing Industry Code, approved September 22,
1933. At the date of this writing a hearing is scheduled for the Motor Vehicle
Retailing Trade code for February 20, 1934, with approximately thirty other
codes in the process of approval ranging from the sawdust industry to the
monument industry.
The method of enforcing the Cleaners' & Dyers' code is substantially as
follows: The state is divided into five districts, each of which is controlled by
a board of seven members. One representative from each one of these boards
is a member of the "state code authority," which authority includes one rep-
resentative of the state consumers and one representative of labor, making a
total of seven thereon. It is provided that the state administrator is the direct-
ing head. The Industrial Commission investigates all complaints for the "au-
thority."
NOTES
ence by employers, (b) that no employee shall be compelled to join a
company union as a condition of employment.6 7
Upon approval the code shall be the standard of fair competition
for the intrastate business of the trade or industry to which the code
shall apply.
Any violation of the provision of the approved code or standard
shall be deemed an unfair method of competition and shall be penalized
as provided for in the enforcement section. The several Circuit Courts
of the State are vested with jurisdiction by any suit in equity instituted
by the several District Attorneys to prevent and restrain such violations
or upon petition by any member of any trade group who is damaged
thereby.
Fifth, that the Governor may modify or amend or terminate any
code or rule thereunder if he shall determine that such does not effec-
tuate the purpose of this Chapter 6 8
Sixth, that as a condition of his approval of any code, the Gover-
nor may require reports, the establishment of a uniform system of ac-
counts, access to the accounts and to records of persons operating un-
der the code, for examination. He may issue subpoenas and take testi-
mony, may direct sworn or unsworn reports in writing to specific ques-
tions, have access to and copy any document in matters relevant to de-
termining whether such code is being effectually operated according
to the purpose and intent of this statute.
It is provided that no person shall without cause fail to comply with
any subpoena, refuse to be sworn or to be examined, or to answer
proper questions, or produce pertinent documents, upon being ordered
to do so by the Governor. Nor shall any person make false entries or
statements in any reports or documents as required. Any person who
violates this provision is guilty of a misdemeanor and shall upon con-
viction pay a fine or not more than $5,000.00, or by imprisonment in
the county jail for not more than one year, or both.69
Seventh, while this Chapter is in effect and for sixty days there-
after any action complying with any code approved hereunder or un-
der any Federal Law, which is exempt in the provisions of the anti-
trust laws of the United States, shall be exempt from the application
of the anti-trust laws of this state as long as the exemption from the
anti-trust laws of the United States prevails.70
67 See Note 58, supra. Cf. sec. 7 (a), N.I.R.A. In this connection see Bayonne
Textile Corp. v. An. Fed. of Silk Workers, (N.J. Ch., 1933), 168 Ati. 799;
H. B. Rosenthal-Ettlinger Co. v. Schlossberg, (Sup. Ct., 1933), 266 N.Y.S.
762; Wis. State Fed. of Labor v. Simplex Shoe Co., Am. Fed. of Labor Week-
ly News Serv., September 21, 1933 at 1, where the trial court held that an
employer had violated sec. 7 (a) by refusing to deal with the vice president
of a shoe union, not an employee of his shop. See order of the president of
September 18, 1933, eliminating from the code submitted by the Bituminous
Coal Industry certain provisions attempting to construe section 7 (a) of the
N.I.R.A. relating to the right of collective bargaining on the part of the
employee.68 109.05. Cf. sec. 4 (a), N.I.R.A.
69 109.06. Cf. sec. 3 (h) to 3 (f) incl., N.I.R.A.
70 109.07. Cf. sec. 5 N.I.R.A.
Whether state anti-trust laws apply to transactions in or affecting inter-
state commerce has not been as yet decided. The question was raised however
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Eighth, any charges incurred by the Governor in connection with
the supervision of codes shall be assessed to the trade or industrial
group to whom such applies.
Ninth, it is intended that under this Chapter, that the State shall
assist the President of the United States in the administration of the
Congressional Act entitled: "The National Recovery Act." The Gov-
ernor may authorize him to utilize such officials and employees where
such is practical, provided that such employees be used in connection
with the supervision of industries doing a substantial proportion of
their business in Wisconsin.
7 1
SUMMARY
It is apparent that the state recovery acts, and more particularly
the Wisconsin Recovery Act can be construed as constitutional; and,
in the light of the most recent decisions, it might be said, although with
some hesitation, that were the constitutionality of this question to come
before the Supreme Court, the Act would probably be held valid. Nev-
ertheless, there are real constitutional difficulties, such as conflict with
the commerce clause and the due process clause of the federal consti-
tution and the theory of delegation of legislative powers.
While it has not been the intention herein to review a philosophy
of American Government, nevertheless we cannot refrain from opin-
ing that the Supreme Court in the past has in most cases based its con-
structions and disposed of the problems involved with reference to the
economic, social and political concepts cherished by the majority then
on the bench. This could be noted in the review of the cases subsequent
to 1908, which showed that whenever a conflict arose between the
rights of a private individual and the public weal, the Supreme Court
almost without exception ruled in favor of the individual.
Under the present emergency, the Supreme Court, however, has
indicated a change in attitude and has indicated a tendency to extend
the scope of the police power.
CLEMENS H. ZEIDLER.
in Standard Oil Co. of Ky. v. Tenn., 217 U.S. 413, 30 Sup. Ct. 543, 54 L.Ed. 817
(1910). Viewing past decisions (Notes 8 and 9, supra) it seems apparent that
the state anti-trust statutes or constitutional provisions (for a survey of this
field see, 32 Col. Law Rev. 347 [1932]) have no affect on those activities over
which congress has validly exercised control under the commerce clause or
under tne Recovery Act, voiding any inconsistent state legislation. In McDer-
mott v. Wisconsin, 228 U.S. 115, 33 Sup. Ct. 431 57 L.Ed. 754 (1913) it was
held that a local pure food statute providing for certain labels to be affixed to
food sold at retail, could not apply where compliance therewith necessitated
the removal of the label required by the Federal Pure Food and Drug Act.
However business essentially local in character may be in all probability be-
yond the power of the federal goverment to regulate. See Notes 7 and 11,
supra. It is also very probable that the states would decline to prosecute their
anti-trust laws against anyone operating under either the federal or local code.
See. Cook, "The Adequacy of Remedies Against Monopoly Under State Law,"
19 Yale Law Jour. 356 (1910). Cf. Railroad Comnm of Wis. v. Chi. B. & Q.
Ry. Co., 257 U.S. 563, 42 Sup. Ct. 232, 66 L.Ed. 371 (1922) ; Alabama v. United
States, 279 U.S. 229, 49 Sup. Ct. 266, 73 L.Ed. 683 (1929). Authoritative dis:
cussions valuable in this connection are: Handler, "Industrial Mergers and
the Anti-Trust Laws," 32 Col. Law Rev. 179 (1932) ; Dickinson, "The Anti-
Trust Laws and Self-Regulation of Industry," 18 A. B. A. Jour. 601 (1932) ;
McLaughlin, Cases on the Federal Anti-Trust Laws of the United States
(1933), 719.
71 Cf. Note 65, supra.
